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The Role of State Antitrust Law in the
Aftermath of Actavis
Richard A. Samp*
The Supreme Court’s June 2013 decision in FTC v. Actavis,
Inc.1 raised as many new questions as it answered regarding
the application of antitrust law to drug patent settlement
agreements. The Court steered a middle course on the issue of
so-called “reverse payment” settlements, concluding that such
settlements might violate federal antitrust law but providing
little guidance regarding when violations should be found. The
Court concluded that reverse payment settlements should be
subject to the “rule of reason,” rejecting both the FTC’s
argument that they should be deemed presumptively
anticompetitive and the much more restrictive “scope of the
patent” test espoused by the lower court.2
Further complicating the issue is the possible application
of state antitrust law. Private plaintiffs who challenge reverse
payment settlements often allege that the settlements violate
state antitrust law as well as federal antitrust law.3
Defendants who successfully defend against federal antitrust
claims may still find themselves facing claims that their patent
settlements nonetheless violated state law. A key issue with
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* Chief Counsel, Washington Legal Foundation.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2333 (2013).
2. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38.
3. See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604
F.3d 98 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466
F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The district court . . . . dismissed the plaintiffs’ statelaw claims, which had alleged violations of the antitrust laws of seventeen
states and violations of consumer protection and unfair competition laws of
twenty-one states, because those claims were based on the same allegations as
the plaintiffs’ federal antitrust claims.” (internal citation omitted)); In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Cipro Cases
I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d
653 (Cal. 2012).
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respect to state claims will have to be addressed by the courts:
to what extent does federal law preempt state antitrust law in
this area? In particular, are states permitted to impose
antitrust liability on parties to reverse payment patent
settlements for conduct not deemed actionable under federal
law?
This paper concludes that state antitrust liability can be
imposed on parties to patent settlements so long as the state
action “parallels” federal antitrust law. On the other hand,
state law is preempted to the extent that it seeks to impose
antitrust liability for conduct not deemed actionable under
federal law; under such circumstances, state-law liability would
be impliedly preempted because it would stand as an obstacle
to accomplishing the purposes of federal patent law. The scope
of preemption likely would include any effort by states to apply
a stricter standard of review to reverse payment patent
settlements—either a “quick look” review accompanied by a
presumption of illegality, or a declaration that such settlements
are “per se” illegal.
Part I of this paper summarizes federal preemption law as
it has been applied to state antitrust actions. It explains that
the U.S. Supreme Court has never interpreted federal antitrust
law as imposing a limit on states’ authority to regulate
business practices deemed by states to have anticompetitive
effects. Nonetheless, federal courts have not hesitated to rule
that state antitrust law is preempted by federal law when they
determine that state law comes into conflict with some other
federal statute. In this instance, the relevant “other federal
statute” is federal patent law.
Part II examines the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision and
explains that Actavis attempted to balance the conflicting
demands of federal antitrust law and patent law. The decision
was based on what the Court deemed the appropriate balance
between those conflicting demands, and the paper concludes
that states may not adopt policies that would conflict with the
balance arrived at by the Court.
Parts III and IV examine the extent to which Activis and
other Supreme Court decisions should be deemed to preempt
state antitrust law challenges to reverse payment patent
settlements. They conclude that state antitrust law should be
deemed preempted to the extent that it attempts to impose
liability under state law in circumstances under which federal
law would not permit imposition of antitrust liability. The
paper recognizes, however, that state antitrust claims of this
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sort are likely to become increasingly common and that
defendants may not always prevail in their efforts to convince
state courts to rule that expansive state law claims are
preempted. Moreover, even when state courts are purporting to
do no more than enforce state antitrust law that merely
“parallels” federal antitrust law, defendants may nonetheless
encounter greater difficulty (in comparison to federal court
proceedings) in convincing a state-court fact-finder that
settlement of their patent dispute had pro-competitive effects.
I. STATE ANTITRUST LAW
Congress has passed a series of laws over the past 125
years designed to prevent businesses from engaging in
anticompetitive conduct that results in higher prices for
consumers. Most prominently, it adopted the Sherman Act in
1890.4 Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination in the form or trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.”5
Among the types of agreements deemed to constitute per se
violations of section 1 are agreements among competitors to
limit output.6
Many states have also adopted antitrust statutes. While
those laws tend to be similar to federal law, their language is
not identical, and state courts routinely interpret state
antitrust laws in ways that diverge sharply from federal law.7
For example, California’s antitrust statute, the Cartwright
Act,8 diverges in a number of respects from federal antitrust
law. The California Supreme Court recently cautioned,
“[i]nterpretations of federal antitrust law are at most

4. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 893 (2007) (“A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or
competing retailers that decreases output or reduces competition in order to
increase price is, and ought to be, per se unlawful.”).
7. Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58
IND. L.J. 375, 377 n.10 (1983) (“As a general matter, state antitrust laws are
substantively similar to federal antitrust law, and many state courts have
held that case law interpreting the federal statutes is fully applicable to
corresponding state statutes. . . . [H]owever, as a result either of statutory
language or judicial interpretation, some state antitrust laws are now broader
than federal law.” (internal citations omitted)).
8. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700–16770 (West 2008).
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instructive, not conclusive, when construing the Cartwright
Act . . . .”9
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected claims that state
antitrust law is preempted whenever it diverges from federal
antitrust law. For example, the Court permitted the Attorneys
General of Alabama, Arizona, California, and Minnesota to file
antitrust claims under their respective state laws against a
group of cement producers even though those state
governments, because they did not purchase cement directly
from the producers but rather purchased only through
intermediaries, would not have been proper plaintiffs under
federal antitrust law.10 Under federal law, when producers
conspire to fix prices, only direct purchasers, and not
subsequent indirect purchasers, are permitted to sue to recover
losses incurred as a result of the conspiracy.11 In contrast,
antitrust laws from the four states permitted recovery by
indirect purchasers.12 The Supreme Court rejected the
defendant cement producers’ assertion that federal antitrust
law was intended to serve as a ceiling on businesses’ liability
for engaging in anticompetitive conduct.13 It stated, “Congress
intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace,
state antitrust remedies. And on several prior occasions, the
Court has recognized that the federal antitrust laws do not preempt state law.”14
On the other hand, state antitrust laws—like all state
laws—are subject to the restrictions imposed by the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,15 and are impliedly preempted

9. Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 292 P.3d 871, 877 (Cal. 2013).
10. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); see id. at 101–02
(“There is no claim that the federal antitrust laws expressly pre-empt state
laws permitting indirect purchaser recovery . . . . Congress intended the
federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies.”).
11. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730–32 (1977); id. at 746 (“[T]he
legislative purpose in creating a group of private attorneys general to enforce
the antitrust laws . . . is better served by holding direct purchasers to be
injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid by them than by attempting to
apportion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of it.”
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
12. ARC, 490 U.S. at 98.
13. Cf. id. at 105 (“Ordinarily, state causes of action are not pre-empted
solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal
law, and no clear purpose of Congress indicates that we should decide
otherwise in this case.” (citation omitted)).
14. Id. at 102 (citation omitted).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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to the extent that they conflict with federal law.16 Such a
conflict arises when “compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility,”17 or when a state law
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”18 On a number of
occasions, the Supreme Court has concluded that state
antitrust law is preempted because it conflicts with a federal
statute other than federal antitrust law.19
The Court has been particularly quick to find preemption
when state antitrust law has an impact on labor law, an area in
which federal law is pervasive.20 Indeed, on at least one
occasion, the Court found that a claim arising under state
antitrust law was preempted by federal labor law even though
the Court concluded that the conduct that gave rise to the state
claim could proceed as a claim under federal antitrust law.21
The Court explained that “Congress and this Court have
carefully tailored the antitrust statutes to avoid conflict with
the labor policy favoring lawful employee organization, not only
by delineating exemptions from antitrust coverage but also by
adjusting the scope of the antitrust remedies themselves.”22
The Court said that state antitrust laws “generally have not
been subjected to this process of accommodation” and thus that
“[t]he use of state antitrust law . . . [must] be pre-empted
because it creates a substantial risk of conflict with policies
central to federal labor law.”23
Accordingly, in any challenge to a “reverse payment”
patent settlement arising under state antitrust law, a court
will likely be required to address whether the claim conflicts
with the “balance” between federal antitrust law and federal
patent law established by the Supreme Court’s Actavis

16. See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013)
(“Even in the absence of an express pre-emption provision, the Court has
found state law to be impliedly pre-empted where it is ‘impossible for a private
party to comply with both state and federal requirements.’”).
17. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43
(1963).
18. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
19. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Local 24 of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358
U.S. 283 (1959).
20. See, e.g., Local 24, 358 U.S. at 296.
21. Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 635–36.
22. Id. at 636.
23. Id. at 635–36.
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decision. If such state-law antitrust claims stand as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress in adopting the patent laws, it will be
preempted by federal law.
II. “REVERSE PAYMENT” PATENT SETTLEMENTS
When parties to litigation enter into a settlement, one
would normally expect that any cash payments would flow
from the defendant to the plaintiff. The defendant pays cash in
return for something from the plaintiff: the abandonment of a
legal claim. The normal expectations have been reversed in the
context of litigation involving prescription drug patents,
however, as the result of financial incentives created by the
Hatch-Waxman Act,24 a federal statute adopted in 1984. HatchWaxman was designed to ensure that generic versions of
prescription drugs enter the market more quickly, thereby
driving down drug prices.25 The Act includes a provision that
permits generic companies, by announcing plans to market a
drug before expiration of the drug’s patent, to essentially force
the patent holder to immediately file a patent infringement
suit.26 That provision sets drug patent litigation apart from all
other types of patent litigation. It allows generics to challenge
the validity of a drug patent in a virtually risk-free manner—
because they can induce a patent lawsuit without actually
selling an infringing product,27 generics can place a patent’s
24. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (HatchWaxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 16, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
25. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was threefold: (1) to
reduce the average price paid by consumers; (2) preserve the technologies
pioneered by the brand-name pharmaceutical companies; and (3) create an
abbreviated new drug application (‘ANDA’) to bring generic drugs to the
market.”).
26. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1566
(2006) (“Submitting an ANDA containing such [a Paragraph IV Certification]
is an act of infringement that often prompts the innovator to file a patent
suit.” (footnote omitted); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012)
(requiring a generic drug company planning to market a generic version of a
patented drug to certify to the FDA, as one of four options, that the patentee’s
patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of
the new drug for which the application is submitted”).
27. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals,
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 293–94 (2011) (“[U]nlike usual patent litigation
where the dispute touches on products that are already on or about to enter
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validity at issue without the risk of incurring the potentially
bankrupting damage awards normally associated with patent
litigation.28
While the cost of litigation is about the only loss that a
generic company is likely to suffer if it loses a drug patent
infringement lawsuit, the stakes are much higher for the
typical prescription drug patent holder. It likely spent
hundreds of millions of dollars to obtain FDA approval to
market its product.29 It can hope to recoup those costs only if it
can maintain the validity of its patent and thereby prevent
competition from generic manufacturers.30 For a typical brandname prescription drug manufacturer, its patents on the drugs
it produces are far and away its most valuable assets. A brandname drug manufacturer often stands to lose billions of dollars
in future revenues if one of its key drug patents is declared
invalid.31 In light of the dynamics created by the HatchWaxman Act, it is hardly surprising that generic companies—
even though they are the defendants in drug patent
infringement litigation—are in a position to demand cash or
other valuable assets in return for agreeing to settlement of the
patent litigation.

the market, Hatch-Waxman litigation occurs prior to the generic drug actually
entering the market.”).
28. See id. Individuals generally lack legal standing to challenge the
validity of patents issued to another. Such challenges only come about as a
defense to an infringement lawsuit filed by the patent holder, and
infringement suits (outside the context of prescription drug patents) may be
filed only after the defendant has started to sell an infringing product.
Because damages in an infringement suit are awarded on the basis of losses
suffered by the patent holder and because such damages can often be many
times larger than the profits earned by the defendant from his infringing
sales, the loss of a significant patent lawsuit can easily drive the infringer into
bankruptcy.
29. See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1564–65 (“[Demonstrating that a drug
is safe and effective as part of a so-called New Drug Application (NDA) is a
lengthy, expensive process, consuming years and many millions of dollars to
conduct the necessary clinical trials.” (footnote omitted)).
30. See id. at 1562–63.
31. See id. at 1557 (“If the generic firm wins in litigation, either by
establishing that the patent is invalid or not infringed by the generic firm’s
competing product, the generic firm wins the means to enter the market prior
to scheduled expiration. Successful pre-expiration challenges reallocate
billions of dollars from producers to consumers.”).

156

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:1

III. ACTAVIS: AN ANTITRUST CHALLENGE TO “REVERSE
PAYMENT” SETTLEMENTS
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long complained
about the allegedly anticompetitive effects of “reverse payment”
patent settlements—settlements whose terms include a cash
payment from the drug patent holder to the alleged infringer.32
The FTC contends that by making such payments, patent
holders are in effect paying potential competitors not to
compete, thereby restricting supply and driving up prices.33
Drug companies have responded that such settlements cannot
have an anticompetitive effect so long as the settlement does
not prohibit any competition that was not already barred under
the terms of the patent.34 They argue that because litigation is
always a drain on productivity, settlements of patent disputes
ought to be encouraged for their pro-competitive effects35 and
that existing patents ought to be presumed valid.36
Lower federal courts have struggled for more than a
decade to craft a coherent theory for addressing antitrust
challenges to reverse payment settlements.37 On the one hand,
there is reason for concern about the competitive consequences
of settlements that include substantial payments from the
patent holder to the alleged infringer. Very large payments
may be an indication that the settling parties recognized that
the patent was particularly vulnerable to invalidation,38 and
thus that competition would have begun much sooner had the
infringement suit been permitted to proceed to a trial, at which

32. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (“Company A sues
Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle under terms
that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented
product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to
pay B many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee
to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of
settlement agreement is often called a ‘reverse payment’ settlement
agreement.”).
33. See Brief for the Petitioner at 15–16, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 267027.
34. See Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 47, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705.
35. Id. at 51.
36. Id. at 18–19.
37. See, e.g., Carl W. Hittinger & Lesli C. Esposito, In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litigation: The Third Circuit’s Controversial Pay-for-Delay Antitrust Decision
Splits with Other Circuit Courts, 58 VILL. L. REV. 103, 107–15 (2013).
38. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent
Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 533–34 (2002).
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the patent almost surely would have been declared invalid.
Viewed in that light, payments from the patent holder to the
alleged infringer can be seen as a device for sharing monopoly
rents made possible by the alleged infringer’s agreement not to
compete.39
On the other hand, a patent holder has a legal right to a
monopoly on the sale of its patented product. It thus is hard to
fault the patent holder for taking steps to enforce that right,
even if those steps include making payments to litigation
opponents where economic incentives created by the HatchWaxman Act essentially require such payments as the price of
settling litigation.40
One potential solution to this dilemma is to instruct trial
courts to examine the strength of the underlying patent.41
Under that approach, a reverse payment patent settlement
would be deemed anticompetitive, and thus in violation of
federal antitrust law, if and only if the court determined that
the patent was weak and likely would have been declared
invalid had the patent infringement suit been allowed to go to
trial. But advocates on both sides of the issue have resisted
that approach because it would require overly complex trials.
District courts conducting an antitrust trial would be required
to retry the previously-settled patent dispute, hearing
voluminous evidence regarding patent validity.42 To avoid that
39. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1749–51 (2003).
40. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187,
209–10 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 144 (2007).
41. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Joblove
v. Barr Labs., Inc, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007) (No. 06-830), 2007 WL 1511527 (“The
dissenting opinion below correctly suggested that a court reviewing an
antitrust challenge to a settlement of a patent infringement claim that
includes a reverse payment should apply the rule of reason—and that, in
doing so, a court should consider ‘the strength of the patent as it appeared at
the time at which the parties settled.’”).
42. Cf. Dolin, supra note 27, at 284–85 (“[T]he antitrust approach may
undermine patent law uniformity, as presumably whatever findings a district
court would make on antitrust liability could—and would—be appealed. The
appeals, like any other appeal on issues of antitrust law, would likely be heard
by the regional circuit courts of appeals, which would then be tasked with
evaluating the validity and strength of the patents underlying the antitrust
litigation. This could put the regional circuits on a collision course with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is a specialist court with
exclusive jurisdiction over patent disputes. Such an outcome would put
complicated technical patent questions in the hands of non-specialist judges,
and would run directly contrary to the congressional desire for uniformity of
patent law throughout the country.” (footnotes omitted)).
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result, the FTC has argued that reverse payment settlements
should be deemed per se antitrust violations,43 reasoning that
patent holders should be required to agree to an earlier onset of
generic competition in lieu of making cash payments to the
alleged infringers.
Prior to 2012, the FTC and private plaintiffs had lost their
challenges to reverse payment drug patent settlements. The
Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits each adopted the socalled “scope of the patent” test, which holds that agreements
that do not extend beyond the exclusionary effect of a patent do
not injure lawful competition unless the patent was procured
by fraud or the infringement claim was objectively baseless.44
Under this standard, the patent holder’s right to exclude
infringing competition is fully respected unless the antitrust
plaintiff can demonstrate that the patent had no exclusionary
effect at all.45
In 2012, the Third Circuit created a split among the federal
appeals courts by adopting the FTC’s position. It held that
reverse payment settlements are prima facie evidence of an
unreasonable restraint of trade, and that the settling parties
can rebut that presumption only if they are able to
demonstrate, during a “quick look” analysis, that the
settlement actually has pro-competitive effects.46 The Third
Circuit added that it agreed with the FTC that
there is no need to consider the merits of the underlying patent suit
because absent proof of other offsetting consideration, it is logical to
conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement

43. By the time Actavis reached the Supreme Court, the FTC had
modified its position. Instead of seeking a per se rule, the FTC argued that
reverse payment settlements should be merely presumptively unlawful, and
that courts should conduct a “quick look” review during which the settling
parties would bear the burden of demonstrating that their settlement was, in
fact, pro-competitive. Brief for the Petitioner at 33–40, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 267027.
44. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 920 (2009); In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213;
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
584 U.S. 919 (2006).
45. See, e.g., Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066 (“[T]he proper analysis of
antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary
potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that
scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”).
46. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated,
133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013).
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by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an
otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.47

Actavis resolved that circuit split.
The Actavis litigation was an FTC challenge to a reverse
payment settlement of patent infringement litigation involving
a brand-name drug called AndroGel.48 Under the terms of the
settlement, the alleged infringers (several generic drug
manufacturers) agreed not to market their generic versions of
AndroGel until August 2015, sixty-five months before the
AndroGel patent was scheduled to expire.49 The settlement also
required the patent holder to pay many millions of dollars to
the generic manufacturers; it stated that the payments were in
return for other services to be performed by the generics for the
patent holder.50 The FTC filed a complaint against all settling
parties under federal antitrust law, contending that “the true
point of the payments was to compensate the generics for
agreeing not to compete against AndroGel until 2015.”51
Applying its previously adopted “scope of the patent” test, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
FTC’s complaint.52 It reasoned that the settlement could not be
deemed to have anticompetitive effects because it permitted
generic competition sixty-five months before the underlying
patent was scheduled to expire.53 The Supreme Court granted
review to resolve the conflict between the Third Circuit on the
one hand and the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits on
the other hand.
In its June 2013 decision, the Supreme Court rejected both
the “scope of the patent” test and the Third Circuit’s
“presumption of unreasonable restraint” test.54 The Court
declined to adopt any bright line test and instead directed
lower courts to analyze the potential anticompetitive effects of
reverse payment settlements under a traditional “rule of
reason” analysis.55 The Court repeatedly emphasized that
courts must “balance” the competing interests of federal
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub
nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
53. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2229.
54. Id. at 2237–38.
55. Id.
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antitrust and patent law, explaining that “patent and antitrust
policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the
patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—
that is conferred by a patent.”56
The Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the concerns
that had led the Eleventh Circuit to adopt the “scope of the
patent” test: the desirability of promoting settlements and the
“fear that antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement
would require the parties to litigate the validity of the patent in
order to demonstrate what would have happened to
competition in the absence of the settlement” and would “prove
time consuming, complex, and expensive.”57 The Court
nonetheless held that other considerations led it “to conclude
that the FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove
its antitrust claim.”58 Chief among those considerations was
the Court’s conclusion that settlements have the “potential for
genuine adverse effects on competition,”59 particularly when
reverse payments are so large that they cannot be explained as
an amount necessary to bring about a settlement.60 The Court
added that a plaintiff should not necessarily be required to
demonstrate the weakness of the underlying patent in order to
establish a prima facie case of antitrust unlawfulness, stating
that “[a]n unexplained large reverse payment itself would
normally suggest that the patentee had serious doubts about
the patent’s survival.”61
In rejecting the FTC’s argument that reverse payment
settlements should be deemed “presumptively unlawful” and
should proceed via a “quick look” approach, the Court
explained:
[A]bandonment of the “rule of reason” in favor of presumptive rules
(or a “quick-look” approach) is appropriate only where “an observer
with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect on consumers and markets.” We do not believe that reverse

56. Id. at 2231.
57. Id. at 2234.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 US. 447, 460–61
(1986)).
60. Id. at 2234–35.
61. Id. at 2236 (emphasis added).
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payment settlements, in the context we here discuss, meet this
criterion.62

Remanding the case to the Eleventh Circuit for further
consideration, the Court said that it would “leave to the lower
courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason litigation.”63
IV. WHAT DID ACTAVIS DECIDE?
Before determining the extent to which state antitrust
regulation of reverse payment settlements is preempted by
federal law, one must first determine what was actually
decided by Actavis. While there is disagreement regarding
which side actually won the case, all agree that the decision left
a considerable number of issues undecided.
The Court explicitly rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “nearautomatic antitrust immunity to reverse payment settlements”
and the FTC’s “presumptively unlawful” approach,64 but
provided relatively vague guidance for determining which such
settlements violate federal antitrust laws and which do not.
The Court said that “[a]n unexplained large reverse payment
itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious
doubts about the patent’s survival,” and that the existence of
such serious doubts “in turn, suggests that the payment’s
objective is to maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared
among the patentee and the challenger rather than face what
might have been a competitive market . . . .”65 But those
sentences raise more questions than they answer; they do not
explain how a trial court is to determine whether the reverse
payment is “unexplained” or “large” or when the “normal”
inference from an “unexplained large reverse payment” might
not be appropriate. The Court punted those issues to trial
courts with instructions to do their best in applying a “rule of
reason” analysis.66 Moreover, while the Court determined that
a plaintiff challenging a reverse payment settlement can
establish a prima facie case without establishing that the
patent was weak and would likely have been invalidated had

62. Id. at 2237 (citations omitted) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
63. Id. at 2238. In light of its Actavis decision, the Court subsequently
vacated and remanded the Third Circuit’s In re K-Dur decision. Upsher-Smith
Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013).
64. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
65. Id. at 2236.
66. Id. at 2237–38.
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the infringement suit gone to trial,67 it did not determine
whether trial courts may impose any limitations on defendants’
rights to make the opposite showing: that the patent almost
surely would have been upheld if the infringement suit had
gone to trial and thus that the reverse payment settlement
could not possibly have had any anticompetitive effects.
The Court did not even determine whether a reverse
payment can ever be actionable when it takes the form of
something other than cash. Use of the word “payment” at least
suggests that the Court did not intend to address transfers of
value other than cash, but the FTC has already rejected that
interpretation and is attempting to use Actavis to challenge
patent litigation settlements in which the value transferred to
the infringing party consisted of an exclusive license to market
a generic version of the drug during the first 180 days following
expiration of the patent.68 Of course, as Seventh Circuit Judge
Richard Posner has pointed out, “any settlement agreement
can be characterized as involving ‘compensation’ to the
defendant, who would not settle unless he had something to
show for the settlement. If any settlement agreement is thus to
be classified as involving a forbidden ‘reverse payment,’ we
shall have no more patent settlements.”69
The Actavis Court did make clear, however, that a license
permitting an alleged infringer to bring its product to market
prior to expiration of the patent cannot be classified as an
unlawful reverse payment.70 Suppose that a patent is not
scheduled to expire for another ten years and that the parties
reach a settlement whereby the alleged infringer agrees not to
compete for the first seven years in return for an exclusive
license to market its product during the final three years.
Arguably, the alleged infringer has received something of
considerable value (a three-year exclusive license) in return for
agreeing not to compete for seven years. The Court nonetheless
indicated that such agreements not to compete are not
actionable under federal antitrust law71—perhaps because the
67. Id. at 2236.
68. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Brief as Amicus Curiae at 15–17,
In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 3:11-cv-05479 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2013).
69. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994
(N.D. Ill. 2003).
70. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
71. Id. (stating that parties to drug patent litigation may, as in other
industries, “settle in other ways [than making large cash reverse payments],
for example, by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s
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exclusive license increases competition and thus benefits not
only the alleged infringer but also consumers, even though the
agreement not to compete arguably harms consumers.
Moreover, the Court’s repeated use of the word “balance”
and the phrase “accommodate patent and antitrust policies”72
made clear that any “rule of reason” analysis undertaken by a
district court must seek to balance the competing interests of
federal antitrust law (to promote competition) and the federal
patent law (to provide monopoly profits to the developers of
new and useful products and thereby encourage development of
more such products in the future).
Those holdings suggest some limits on the extent to which
states should be permitted to impose antitrust liability on
companies that enter into reverse payment drug patent
settlements. In particular, any state-law liability is preempted
to the extent that it would upset the balance between federal
antitrust law and patent law established by Actavis because
such liability would “stand[ ] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”73
V. ACTAVIS’S PREEMPTIVE EFFECT
Application of state antitrust law to reverse payment
settlements is not merely a hypothetical possibility. There are a
fair number of pending lawsuits that challenge reverse
payment settlements on state-law grounds. The California
Supreme Court has agreed to review one such suit.74 In seeking
affirmance of the appeals court’s dismissal of the suit, the

market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee paying the
challenger to stay out prior to that point”).
72. See, e.g., id. at 2231, 2233.
73. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
74. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012). The California
Supreme Court held the case in abeyance while the U.S. Supreme Court was
considering Actavis. It is reviewing a California Court of Appeals decision that
invoked the “scope of the patent” test to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims that a
reverse payment settlement violated state antitrust law. In re Cipro Cases I &
II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal.
2012). The reverse payment settlement being challenged in In re Cipro Cases I
and II was the subject of an unsuccessful challenge in the Second Circuit
under federal antitrust law. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010).
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defendants argue inter alia that the suit is preempted by
federal law.75
As noted above, there is precedent for a finding that state
antitrust law is preempted to the extent that it conflicts with
the policy underlying a federal statute.76 Moreover, in the
context of patent law, federal courts have not hesitated to
preempt state laws that the courts deem to stand as an
obstacle to accomplishing Congress’s objectives (i.e.,
encouraging efforts to develop new and useful products).77 To
the extent that any portions of Actavis’s holding can be deemed
to reflect the Court’s perception of Congress’s new-productdevelopment objectives, a state law is preempted if it is
inconsistent with that holding and seeks to impose a greater
degree of antitrust liability on the parties to a reverse payment
settlement.
Actavis’s treatment of settlements involving a compromise
entry date appears to meet that description. Actavis held that
federal antitrust liability could not arise from a settlement in
which the generic manufacturer agrees not compete for a
number of years and in return is rewarded with an exclusive
license to market its product several years in advance of the
patent’s expiration date.78 Accordingly, states are not permitted
to impose antitrust liability under similar circumstances
because doing so would upset the balance that, according to
Actavis, Congress sought to achieve between antitrust and
patent law.
Other issues left open by Actavis are likely to be answered
in the years ahead. For example, the Supreme Court did not
specify whether noncash benefits received by a generic
manufacturer in connection with a patent settlement can ever
serve as the basis for federal antitrust liability. If the Supreme
Court eventually answers that question by stating: “No, federal

75. See, e.g., Answer Brief of Respondent Bayer Corp. at 41–47, In re
Cipro Cases I & II, No. S198616 (Cal. May 30, 2012), 2012 WL 2379475.
76. See, e.g., Local 24 of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283
(1959); supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d
1362, 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that District of Columbia law
prohibiting sale of patented drugs at “an excessive price” was impliedly
preempted by federal patent law because it interfered with “Congress’s
intention to provide . . . pharmaceutical patent holders with the pecuniary
reward that follows from the right to exclude granted by a patent”).
78. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013); see supra notes 71–
72 and accompanying text.
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antitrust law will not examine settlement benefits other than
cash that flow to the infringing party,” then it is likely that
state antitrust law would be required to conform to that rule.
The potential grounds for such a ruling (a desire both to
promote settlement of patent disputes and to uphold reliance
interests in existing patents) are based largely on values
embedded in federal patent law.
There is little reason to believe, however, that the Court
would prevent application of state antitrust law to patent
settlement agreements where state law is fully consistent with
federal antitrust law. Even in areas subject to extensive federal
regulation, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of
states to engage in parallel regulation that is not inconsistent
with the federal regulation.79 Unless the Court were to
determine, as in Connell,80 that states could not be trusted to
properly accommodate the objectives of the federal statute at
issue (here, federal patent law), there is no reason to conclude
that Congress would not have wanted states to be permitted to
police the same sorts of anticompetitive conduct that is policed
by federal antitrust law. Moreover, states are likely free to
impose greater penalties on the proscribed conduct than is
available under federal law. As the Court explained in
California v. ARC America Corp., state antitrust law is not
required to adhere to the same set of sanctions imposed by
federal antitrust law.81
It seems reasonably clear, however, that Actavis prohibits
states from adopting the procedural devices rejected by the
U.S. Supreme Court—either a per se condemnation of reverse
payment settlements or a presumption of illegality
accompanied by “quick look” review. The Supreme Court
rejected those approaches because it determined that in many
cases there might well be pro-competitive economic
justifications for reverse payment settlements and that
presuming their illegality could result in the suppression of
economically useful conduct.82 State antitrust laws that
adopted the FTC’s proposed presumption of illegality would be
subject to similar criticism, and thus would likely be impliedly
79. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008)
(authorizing states to impose regulations on medical devices that precisely
“parallel” federal regulations).
80. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
81. 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989).
82. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
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preempted as inconsistent with the careful balance between
antitrust and patent law established by Actavis.
CONCLUSION
Because Actavis left so many questions unanswered
regarding the application of federal antitrust law to patent
settlement agreements, the extent to which federal law
preempts the application of state antitrust law to such
agreements remains similarly unsettled. One can be reasonably
confident that if private plaintiffs become dissatisfied with the
results of pending litigation under federal antitrust law, they
will turn with increasing frequency to state antitrust law as an
alternative remedy. Even if state law ends up doing no more
than “parallel” federal antitrust law, defendants are likely to
incur substantial litigation costs fending off such state claims
in the years to come.

